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Abstract: During the last four decades, China has moved from being an isolated country 
separated from the international community to having become one of the world’s major 
powers. It is vital to understand what is guiding Chinese foreign policy, why this is so, and 
not least what kind of power China is and will be in the future. This article analyses the vital 
elements and thinking that guides Chinese foreign policy, its priorities and decision making 
process. It is found that China’s foreign policy is embedded in domestic issues. The foremost 
foreign policy objective is domestic political stability, which in turn is a necessity for the 
survival of one-party rule. Both are dependent on a combination of two key factors: 
continuing domestic economic growth and nationalism. The foreign policy is also closely 
linked to the Chinese self-perception, both its self-superiority/self-inferiority dualism and its 
multitude of confusing (overlapping) identities about what China is and should be. A key 
turning year is 2008 when the “global” financial crisis severely affected the United States and 
Europe at a time of Chinese economic success, which gave China confidence to pursue a 
more active and aggressive/assertive stance on the international stage. It is concluded that 
China under Xi Jinping will not be a status que power accepting the world as it is, but nor are 
we to expect China to become a revisionist power aiming to remodel the global order. China 
is what can best be described as a responsible reformer “striving for achievements”. 
 
 
Introduction 2 
During the last four decades, China has moved from being an isolated country separated from 
the international community, having become one of the world’s major powers and being on its 
way to becoming the biggest economy in the world. Being at the epicentre of a global power 
shift from “the West” to “the East”, and from “the North” to “the South”, there has been a lot 
of attention given to its external affairs, including its foreign policy goals and behaviour. To 
accurately understand China’s external affairs, there is a need to grasp the bigger picture, to 
be able to understand what is guiding the Chinese foreign policy, why this is so, and how the 
Chinese foreign policy decision making works. Without accurately grasping the larger foreign 
policy dynamics behind China’s policy, it is simply not possible to accurately understand and 
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in the continuation predict either its overall policy or its behaviour in specific cases, be it 
towards Russia, Europe, South East Asia, or how it handles the events in Ukraine or Syria. 
Nor is it possible to understand what kind of power China is today and will be in the future. 
This article will try to grasp the larger foreign policy dynamics, trying to understand 
what is driving China’s foreign policy and what kind of power China is and will be, and why 
this is so. It will analyse the vital elements that is guiding Chinese foreign policy and foreign 
policy thinking, its foreign policy priorities and decision making process. Focus will be on the 
period since 2000, with a certain emphasis on capturing the major developments that have 
happened since the election of Xi Jinping.  
The article is divided into five parts. First, it will examine vital elements in Chinese 
foreign policy thinking, which sets up the framework for understanding Chinese foreign 
policy itself. This section reviews where China comes from and analyses how it perceives 
itself and what its position and role in the world is and ought to be. In section two, Chinese 
foreign policy priorities are outlined and its practical foreign policy is discussed. In section 
three, the processes behind the Chinese foreign policy are reviewed, outlining the actors 
behind Chinese foreign policy decision making traditionally as well as under Xi Jinping. 
Section four analyses the developments in foreign policy during the 21st century, outlining 
what type of power China is and will be. Finally, conclusions will be drawn, arguing that 
China is neither a status quo power accepting the world as it is, nor a revisionist power aiming 
to remodel the global order. Rather it has become what can best be described as a responsible 
reformer “striving for achievements”. 
 
 
Vital Elements in Chinese Foreign Policy Thinking 
Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 the Communist Party 
of China (CCP) has sought to regain the respect and dignity of being a great nation that has 
been lost after what the Chinese perceive as a “century of humiliation” when external powers 
dominated the region. However, despite three decades of development, China still shows a 
dual identity of self-superiority and self-inferiority – which can also be seen in its foreign 
policy. On the one hand, China has the mentality of being superior, being the “Middle 
Kingdom” with the natural right of ruling the world. At the same time, China feels very 
insecure and weak, and under pressure from threats from within as well as from the outside. 
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Chinese foreign policy thinking is closely linked to Chinese self-perception. At the core is the 
perception of identity - the way in which Chinese scholars, academics and policy makers are 
thinking about China itself. Since China lost its centrality in Asia, from being the centre of 
power to whom others paid tribute, to becoming a semi-colonial country  in the mid-19th 
century, the question of Chinese national identity and in what direction it should evolve has 
been a constant theme – who am I? How should I evolve? (Zhu, 2010: 19) This has created 
debates about what kind of power China is to be and what international role it should seek. 
Looking beyond the self-superiority/self-inferiority dualism, China’s rise has gone hand 
in hand with a confusing multitude of overlapping ideas about what China is and should be. 
Simultaneously China is a developing state, a (re-)emerging power and a global power (Wei 
and Fu, 2011). To this should be added its role as a regional power (Breslin, 2009, 2013). 
These multiple personalities in turn affect the different ways in which China builds 
partnerships and alliances. As a developing country it shares experiences and concerns with 
other less developed states. Since the Cold War era China has seen itself as a leader in the 
Non-Aligned Movement and a champion of Third World interests. As an emerging power it 
seeks alliances and partnership with other dissatisfied large powers, most clearly seen in the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India, South Africa). As a global power, being a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council and a member of the G20, China is in “direct institutional 
contact with the established powers as one of a small number of other states that wield, and 
share, both global power and global responsibility” (Breslin, 2013: 617).Though the concept 
of G2 (China and the United States) is resisted in China itself, it is also by some seen as a 
quasi-superpower second in the global system only to the United States – a position creating 
expectations (Breslin, 2013: 617). Lastly, it is clear that China is already a regional power, 
closely watched and a key focus point for its regional neighbour’s foreign policy strategy and 
security concerns. Not surprisingly, an extensive debate has evolved about foreign policy 
strategy. 
Over time there has been a trend where China gradually has leaned towards trying to 
become an insider rather than outsider in the international community. Some of this includes 
internalising the task to create an image of China as a “responsible great power”, or 
“responsible stakeholder” if using the western term, that neither threatens the interest of 
others, nor challenge the exiting global order, while facilitating for continued regional and 
global economic prosperity. However, at the same time China does provide an alternative to 
the existing liberal international order (Breslin, 2009: 822). Reiterating that, in contrast to the 
United States and the West, it has no normative agenda, not seeking to impose values and 
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policies putting an outmost respect on state sovereignty China offers “a democratic 
international order” as an alternative to the “unipolar hegemony of the Pax Americana” 
(Breslin, 2009: 825). This alternative is based on multilateralism with emphasis on the role of 
the United Nations as a global security guarantor, a commitment to the settling of disputes by 
consultation and dialogue as opposed to force and to global economic development with 
emphasis on the responsibility of the developed world to help developing states, and a “spirit 
of inclusiveness” where “all civilizations coexist harmoniously and accommodate each other” 
(Ding, 2008: 197). 
 
Priorities in Chinese Foreign Policy 
Often China’s foreign policy is expressed in terms of different principles and slogans, such as 
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, “Peaceful Rise/Development”, and 
“Harmonious World”. These in turn have formed the basis of foreign policy practices. This 
said, it is important to note that implicit but very important goals of the regime are also taken 
into account when forming foreign policy, something deliberated on more extensively further 
below. 
Underpinning Chinese foreign policy for the last 60 years are the so called “Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” (United Nations, 2014: 70). These are 1) mutual respect 
for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) mutual non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful co-
existence. In practical terms these principles have facilitated a foreign policy focusing on 
“good-neighbourly relations”, aimed at preventing external instability to negatively affect 
internal frictions within China, and a strict interpretation of non-interference in internal affairs 
most importantly concerning Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. 
But when looking beyond principles, what are in fact China’s foreign policy objectives?  
Officially they are defined as 1) domestic political stability; 2) sovereign security, territorial 
integrity and national unification; and 3) China’s sustainable economic and social 
development (Jakobson, 2013:  4). This is the outcome of a policy founded on the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and driven by a number of “core interests”. The main 
drivers behind the core interests are, to cite Timothy R. Heat (2012: 64), concerns “about 
externally derived threats to China’s development and threats to China’s access to overseas 
resources and goods upon which its economy is increasingly dependent”. 
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The first three core interests are straight forward, being “National Sovereignty”, “National 
Security” and “Territorial Integrity”. However, China does tend to use a more strict 
interpretation of the three than other countries. It is simply not showing the same flexibility in 
interpretation as many other countries, as can be seen in for example Russia’s interpretation of 
territorial integrity and national sovereignty (most recently in Ukraine) (Carlsson, Oxenstierna 
& Weissmann, 2015). The fourth core interest, “National Unification”, is uniquely Chinese, it 
being a country where separation is seen as temporary while awaiting a return to the natural 
state of a unified China. The emphasis here is of course on the “renegade province” Taiwan. 
The belief in the unification of China has grown stronger, as Hong Kong and Macao have 
been returned; only Taiwan is missing. The last two core interests concern domestic issues, 
which, as already discussed, also drive foreign policy. They are “China’s Political System and 
Social Stability” and “The Basic Safeguard of Interests for Sustained Economic and Social 
Development”.  
These core interests are not set in stone, nor are they in practice as clear as they seem in 
the official documents. When looking behind the big headlines about core interests, the 
picture gets messy as what is to be perceived as a core interests is disputed and debated within 
China. For example, it has been argued that sea lanes of communications are a core interest, 
which if accepted would have impact on how to develop China’s naval capabilities as well as 
whether the United States naval superiority in East Asia should be accepted. It has also been 
argued that the Middle East is part of China’s core interest, as energy from the area is 
essential to ensure long term economic development in China.  
“Core interest”, as argued by Timothy R. Heath (2012), is a concept that the Chinese 
leaders are likely to continue to expand and refine. Such moves have already been seen; 2011 
being the first time a government white paper explicitly listed China’s “political system” and 
“national reunification” among core interests, though Chinese officials have mentioned them 
in other contexts. The 2011 Peaceful Development White Paper was also the first to refine the 
concept of “developmental interests”, specifying that China seeks to “safeguard” the 
“sustainability” of this kind of interests, as opposed to merely securing the resources 
themselves.  
 
Foreign Policy in Practice 
China has been keen to learn from the experiences of previous great powers and the legacy of 
its own glorious past. In the foreign policy context China is trying to reach out to other 
countries, emphasising the mutual benefits from doing things together. This way it tries to be 
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different from the Western security governance practices of “do as I say, not as I do” 
(Kavalski, 2012: 6). China here puts particular emphasis on its own experiences of 
modernisation, as a successful late-developing country, being a possible model for others 
(Spakowski, 2009: 489-90). Of course this is viewed in a positive way in many places, 
particularly in the global South and in non-liberal and non-democratic states or countries with 
a colonial past. 
Chinese foreign policy is embedded in domestic issues. In fact, the foremost foreign 
policy objective in China is to ensure domestic political stability. The ultimate goal is to 
ensure the survival of one-party rule and the socialist system, which in turn is dependent on 
political stability. Domestic political stability and the regime survival are both dependent on a 
combination of two factors: continuing domestic economic growth and nationalism. 
Nationalism here has replaced political ideology to legitimise authoritarian one-party rule, as 
the latter has lost much of its credibility as a way to legitimise the state of affairs. 
There is a direct link between economic growth and nationalism, where economic 
growth works as a way to satisfy nationalist sentiments rather than pursue overly aggressive 
nationalist policies in for example the South China Sea or against Taiwan – without growth, 
Beijing would have to elaborate on contingencies such as occupying new islands in the South 
China Sea, or even launch an invasion of Taiwan-held offshore islands, such as Mazu or 
Jinmen, to keep its domestic audience content. Thus, nationalism is useful, but dangerous. If 
not kept under control, China risks being drawn into direct conflict with its neighbours. This 
in turn would undermine economic growth. In short, it is a delicate balancing act.  
 
Decision Making in Foreign Policy 
To understand foreign policy, it is necessary to understand the underlying decision making 
process, including the actors involved. In official foreign policy making, three actors stand 
out: the Communist Party of China, the State Council and the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) (for a good overview of these three actors see e.g. Jakobson & Knox, 2010: 4-16). The 
former two have separate decision making structures, though overlaps exist in function, 
authority and personnel. The party does have supreme authority. In addition to the party and 
government structures under the state council, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) always 
has and continues to play an important role in foreign policy making on security issues and 
other areas related to military affairs. However, foreign policy making goes beyond official 
structures, and a number of factors besides official structure need to be taken into account. 
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One of the better and up-to date conceptualisations of Chinese foreign policy decision making 
has been presented by David Shambaugh (2013: 61-72), who conceptualised the foreign 
policy process as consisting of five concentric circles – 1) senior leaders, 2) ministries, 3) 
intelligence organs, 4) localities and corporations, and 5) society. Of the five circles, it is only 
the inner two that actually make foreign policy decisions. The other three only influence these 
decisions.
3
 The senior leadership includes the top leadership and the institutions with whom 
they interact. It should be noted that here foreign policy is only a small part of their work. It 
has been estimated that international affairs take up a mere 10-15 per cent of the Politburo 
leaders’ time. The second sphere includes a range of ministries and ministerial level agencies, 
of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the most important. This said, it should be 
emphasised that many Chinese academics and people related to the foreign ministry always 
emphasise how weak the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, noting that there is a need to 
coordinate with a lot of other actors and that the Ministry of Commerce is a dominant actor. It 
is also noteworthy that the State Councillor responsible for foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi, is not 
even a member of the Politburo.  
The third sphere includes a range of intelligence organs, including institutes such as 
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), China Institute of 
International Studies (CIIS), PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), Central Party School 
Institute of Strategic Studies and key universities such as Peking, Renmin, Tsinghua, Fudan, 
and China Foreign Affairs University. They contribute with information, advice and 
intelligence to ministerial-level agencies. Sometimes they are also attached to such ministries, 
as in the case of CICIR which is attached to the State Council and CIIS to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Localities and corporations consist of China’s large state-owned enterprises 
with operations abroad, as well as provincial and municipal level governments that make 
autonomous decisions on a range of topics and issues. Fifth and last, individuals in society, 
including individuals such as members of think-tanks expressing their views in the media and 
bloggers active on micro-media (weibo) and the internet all try to influence foreign policy. 
It should be emphasised that the knowledge of the exact practice of the Chinese Foreign 
Policy decision making process, often even its motivations, is limited. This said, some 
valuable research has been undertaken (See e.g. Rozman, 2013; Barnett, 1985; Jakobson & 
Knox, 2010; Lampton, 2001). However, even in more transparent countries, it can be unclear 
why in fact the processes leading to major decisions were initiated. This is even more so in 
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China, where the governance process is very informal compared to the West – less so in 
foreign policy, but still important in particular in economic policy and issues related to 
economic reform (Harris, 2014: 26-27). Politics in China “should be thought of as an endless 
web of bureaucratic and political constituencies that compete and bargain for position and 
resources within a vertically organized Leninist system” (Shambaugh, 2002: 36). It is also in 
this vertical system that, “unlike in democracies, political competition is waged ...  within the 
CCP and government departments – rather than being open to the public.” (Harris, 2014: 26) 
Within this system personal power and relationships (guanxi), between individuals and 
towards a patron, are critical (Harris, 2014). Exactly as argued by Jakobson and Knox (2010: 
15–17), the policy making process is consensus-driven and highly dependent on informal 
channels and allegiances. 
 
Foreign Policy Decision Making under Xi Jinping 
Xi Jinping has been responsible for major changes in the Chinese decision making process, 
including foreign policy. Xi’s leadership seems to be more centralized in the general secretary 
himself, a style very different from the “collective leadership” that the party has followed 
since Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in the late 1970s. Rather than adhering to collective 
decision making, Xi has taken all power in his own hand, including the power over the Armed 
Forces.
4
 In this context, it should be noted that he is leading a, under Chinese circumstances, 
most unbalanced Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), the top policy-making body in 
China, where six out of the seven seats are filled with officials belonging to his party faction. 
These six are all officials linked to the former CCP general secretary (1989-2002) Jiang 
Zemin who dominated the leadership transition despite having left all offices eight years ago 
and now being 88 years old (Dotson, 2014: 14–19). In contrast, Hu Jintao, the outgoing 
general secretary (2002-2012), was only able to secure one seat for his followers (Dotson, 
2014). 
During Xi Jinping’s leadership the role of the military and its influence in the foreign 
policy making process has increased.
5
 There are two reasons for this: Xi’s experience from 
the military and the fact that more military issues have reached the top level of the agenda. 
His military experience also creates a strong informal link between the military and the PBSC, 
where the man in charge is the only one with a military background. External pressure, not 
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least the conflict with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and in the South China Sea but 
also cyber-attacks, facilitates the military influence by putting military issues at the top of the 
agenda. Thus, there is more space for the military in a political situation where the person in 
charge has a personal interest in and high ambitions for the military. 
 
Chinese Foreign Policy in the 21st Century 
China is best understood as a partial power, being on the one hand a member of the UN 
Security Council and the G-20, a key actor on international summits etc., while on the other 
hand remaining reactive and passive in these venues (Shambaugh, 2013: 45). However, 
China’s diplomacy has remained very risk averse and been guided by narrow national interest. 
China has sought the lowest-common denominator and, as far as possible, it has stuck to the 
least controversial position, having a preference not to make the first move but wait on others 
to show their positions before deciding on its own. There are a number of exceptions to this 
principle when it comes to perceived narrow national interests. That is first and foremost 
Taiwan and other issues that may interfere with China’s sovereignty (Tibet, Xinjiang and 
maritime territorial claims in the South and East China Seas), but also issues relating to 
human rights. Here China has instead been both very active and extremely vigilant. 
China’s engagement with the international community can be traced back to late 1990s 
when China begun to look outwards. At the forefront of this drive to modernise its foreign 
policy, once again being an active part in the international community can be characterised as 
a pursuit of “comprehensive power”, acknowledging that a global power needs 
multidimensional strength. During the following decade, China’s engagement with the 
international community boomed. This engagement included all spheres, ranging from 
economic and socio-cultural, to the military sphere. China’s “go out”, “go global” strategy 
aimed at encouraging Chinese firms and other localities and organisations to expand abroad, a 
strategy that took up speed in the mid-2000s. The PLA did start to engage internationally, 
including conducting several hundred exchanges each year.  
Underlying China’s foreign policy since 2000 is China’s “new security concept” (NSC) 
(Bergsten, 2008, especially chapters 10 & 5). Announced at the ASEAN Regional Forum in 
1997, the NSC is a form of grand strategy pronouncing the overarching principles to guide 
foreign policy. It was a direct response to the expansion of NATO and the United States’ 
attempts to strengthen its alliances and security cooperation in the world. It sets out to 
elaborate on China’s aspirations in the new post-Cold War order. Besides acknowledging the 
adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, it emphasises mutually beneficial 
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economic cooperation, confidence building and the establishment of “strategic partnerships” 
not directed at a third country.  
The new security concept sets the stage for what has become the foremost emphasis of 
Chinese foreign policy: China’s “peaceful rise”.6 The aim with this concept was to reassure 
the international community, in particularly neighbouring countries, that China was a benign 
country and not a revisionist state that sought hegemony. Emphasis was put on arguing that 
China’s rise is not a zero-sum game, but a mutual win situation. The phrase was later 
reframed as “peaceful development” as the debate took a turn that Beijing did not like; the 
word “rise” was in focus in the debate rather than, as China would have preferred, “peaceful”. 
This was part of a wider debate on whether China was a threat or not. 
Since 2000, China has maintained stable relations with the United States and other 
major powers, while at the same time strengthening its relations with its neighbours in Asia as 
well as on its periphery. These moves were extremely successful, with China building 
excellent ties – or at least better - with most of its Asian neighbours and peripheral countries. 
China did also expand its perspective, giving attention also to Africa, Latin America and 
Europe. This was not to last… 
A key year for Chinese foreign policy is 2008. At the time, it had already become a 
major player on the regional and global stage, having been one of the world’s fastest growing 
economies and a major contributor to world economic growth for several years. At this point, 
the “global” financial crisis was severely affecting the United States and the West, while 
leaving China relatively unharmed. The crisis affecting the United States and Europe at a time 
of Chinese economic success facilitated a renewed Chinese confidence to take a more active 
and aggressive/combative stance on the international and regional stage. This more assertive 
stance has been accelerated by nationalistic pressure. Consequently, since 2009 the “assertive 
China discourse” has become a widespread narrative in the debate on Chinese foreign policy 
in the West (there has been a considerable debate about whether Chinese foreign policy in fact 
has become more assertive. See Jerdén, 2014; Johnston, 2013; Scobell & Harold, 2013). 
Furthermore, in the case of Europe, the crisis has completed a mental shift in China. Put 
simply, since the crisis, Europe has in the mind of the Chinese lost its last credibility to 
compete about being the number two power behind the US.  
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and equal international system has not been a success. 
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Since 2011 China has made attempts to regain the regional and international trust. 
China’s more assertive behaviour has destroyed most of two decades of trust-building, with 
China having strived to convince both its regional neighbours and the international 
community that it is not a threat, but a peacefully rising and responsible power. Arguably the 
most illustrative example here is China’s approach towards the South China Sea dispute and 
its South East Asian neighbours. Since the early 1990s a lot of trust has been tediously built 
by political efforts and economic investments to build good and peaceful relations, which 
were largely destroyed as a result of China’s more assertive policies (Weissmann, 2010, 2012, 
2014, 2015). Not surprisingly, the move by Beijing in late 2007 to consolidate its 
jurisdictional claims followed by a more active and assertive pursuit of its claims in 2009-
2010, including the imposing of unilateral fishing bans, seizing of Vietnamese fishing boats 
and equipment, and the harassment of US ships intruding beyond the 12-mile territorial limit, 
was not good for its the image as a peacefully developing country that it wants to project.
7
 To 
regain lost trust is a difficult endeavour as it will take time to get back to the mid-2000 
situation - if at all possible. This is particularly true as Beijing’s rhetoric has not been matched 
by its actions, such as its military build-up including its pursuit to become a maritime power 
by continuing to pursue its claims in the South and East China Seas. In addition, relations 
with the United States was strained by the Chinese active opposition to the US renewed 
interest in, and military rebalancing to, Asia.  
However, attempts to counteract the “assertive China discourse” has not been helped by 
the development of a parallel narrative in China, arguing that China has moved from a 
“keeping a low profile” strategy to adopting one of “striving for achievements” (Qin, 2014). 
This has been part of a heated debate between two foreign policy strategies, whether China 
should pursue “the strategy of keeping a low profile” focusing on economic gains as it did 
under Deng Xiaoping, or “striving for achievements” putting emphasis on the strengthening 
of political support as the way to be successful in the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Yan, 
2014; Qin, 2014). Proponents of the latter argue that “striving for achievements” strategy has 
made major progress after the election of Xi Jinping in 2012 (Yan, 2014). However, even if 
accepting that Xi leans towards striving for achievements as the evidence so far indicates, it is 
most unlikely going to be a complete departure from the old Chinese foreign policy strategy 
(Qin, 2014). 
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level city in Hainan, Sansha, to govern the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. 
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Chinese Foreign Policy since 2013 under the Leadership of Xi Jinping 
When looking beyond underlying principles, it is clear that the new Xi Jinping’s 
administration is pursuing a more active foreign policy. The main aim of the new foreign 
policy is “to achieve modernization, create a benevolent and peaceful external environment, 
and take steps that allow it to develop its domestic economy” (Zhao, 2013). To achieve these 
aims China seeks to maintain its peaceful relations with other states, both nearby and globally. 
This includes a need to manage conflicts with neighbours over territorial and maritime issues. 
It is also important to counteract United States’ decision to refocus its foreign policy putting 
more emphasis on Asia. A key element is to secure natural resources, including, but not 
exclusively, oil and gas, with the purpose to build a momentum for domestic development. 
The overarching goal is to ensure prosperity in China, to open up “new paths for the nation’s 
rejuvenation, and create conditions that benefit the Chinese people” (Zhao, 2013).  
At least so far, it seems like foreign policy will not be one of Xi Jinping’s top priorities 
as domestic pressure will need to be his main focus. After three decades of “reform and 
opening up” it is clear that China is approaching more difficult times as it has to manage 
pressing domestic challenges, including slowing economic growth, shifting social structures 
and socio-economic unrest caused by increasing socioeconomic inequalities. Thus it can be 
expected that the foreign policy path will be even more guided and driven by domestic 
concerns than it used to be; be it to satisfy nationalistic demands, energy needs or the need for 
economic growth.  
When looking at Xi Jinping’s foreign policy a number of priorities have been standing 
out. First of all, there has been emphasis on the need to maintain a stable international 
environment, in particular with regard to the United States. President Xi Jinping has here, 
during a trip to the United States in February 2012, proposed the idea of “a new type of 
relationship between major countries in the 21st century” that in its vagueness has been 
generally endorsed in Washington. The underlying premises are that a major conflict between 
the United States and China is not inevitable, and that a conflict would be catastrophic for 
both sides, with even non-cooperation being extremely costly (Lampton, 2013). Thus Xi 
argues for “mutual understanding and strategic trust,” “respecting each other’s ‘core 
interests,’”  “mutually beneficial cooperation,” and “enhancing cooperation and coordination 
in international affairs and on global issues.” (Xi, 2012)  
 
As a response to the United States’ rebalancing Xi is also giving to developing China’s 
relations with “old friends”, that is countries that have stood by China in the past or are to 
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whom China is indebted (Aoyama 2014). These approaches have not always been welcome or 
successful, but they have at least sent a message to Washington about what China thinks of 
the rebalancing to Asia (Aoyama 2014). 
Beijing’s focus on the emerging developing world and emerging powers is also partially 
part of this strategy. China has been trying to widen its impact in the emerging developing 
world, trying to increase its presence and influence in Central Asia, South Asia, Latin 
America and Africa. It is also trying to develop its cooperation with other emerging major 
states, such as India, Mexico, South Africa and Russia. This includes a range of new 
initiatives, such as the “Silk Road Economic Belt”, aimed at establishing a transport corridor 
from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea, and a “Maritime Silk Road” from China to India, 
Africa and the Mediterranean, as well as the creation of an “Asian Infrastructure Bank” 
(AIIB), which has been seen as a “World bank” for Asia, and a “New Development Bank” 
(NDB), known as the BRICS Bank, which in turn can be viewed as a competitor to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Not all of these will come through - some, like the “Silk 
Road Economic Belt”, should be seen more as ideas/visions than actual plans.8 In short, in its 
counteracting of the US, it seeks all avenues it can find.  
 
Conclusion 
Major developments have been seen in Chinese foreign policy during the last one and a half 
decades, with Xi Jinping’s more active foreign policy being but the last example. It is clear 
that China under Xi Jinping will not be a status quo power accepting the world as it is, nor are 
we to expect China to become a revisionist power aiming to remodel the global order. Even if 
accepting that Xi leans towards “striving for achievements” as the evidence so far indicates, it 
is still most unlikely that there will be a complete departure from the old Chinese foreign 
policy strategy of “keeping a low profile”. In 2010 Shaun Breslin referred to China as a 
“dissatisfied responsible great power” (Breslin, 2010). This is still the case, though by now 
China has moved beyond merely being dissatisfied to becoming what can best be described as 
a responsible reformer “striving for achievements”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 In addition to being best described as an idea or presented by Xi Jinping, thus giving room for a lot of 
flexibility in the (possible) implementation, in the case of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” it should be noted that 
despite the name, the Chinese emphasis is on Central Asia where the Silk Road belt is aimed at helping to ensure 
stability in the Chinese border area (Carlsson, Oxenstierna & Weissmann, 2015). 
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